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Detecting subtle indicators of trustworthiness is highly adaptive for moving effectively amongst social
partners. One powerful signal is gaze direction, which individuals can use to inform (or deceive) by
looking toward (or away from) important objects or events in the environment. Here, across 5 experi-
ments, we investigate whether implicit learning about gaze cues can influence subsequent economic
transactions; we also examine some of the underlying mechanisms. In the 1st experiment, we demon-
strate that people invest more money with individuals whose gaze information has previously been
helpful, possibly reflecting enhanced trust appraisals. However, in 2 further experiments, we show that
other mechanisms driving this behavior include obligations to fairness or (painful) altruism, since people
also make more generous offers and allocations of money to individuals with reliable gaze cues in
adapted 1-shot ultimatum games and 1-shot dictator games. In 2 final experiments, we show that the
introduction of perceptual noise while following gaze can disrupt these effects, but only when the social
partners are unfamiliar. Nonconscious detection of reliable gaze cues can prompt altruism toward others,
probably reflecting the interplay of systems that encode identity and control gaze-evoked attention,
integrating the reinforcement value of gaze cues.
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Social interactions frequently result in the formation and adjust-
ment of opinions about the character of other people (Heider,
1958; E. E. Jones & Davis, 1965). Prominent models posit that
these opinions center around two dimensions: warmth/emotion and
competence/dominance (Todorov, Baron, & Oosterhof, 2008). Ap-
praisals of the first of these dimensions can be expressed in
judgments about the trustworthiness of individuals encountered in
our social environment and can reflect emotional or structural cues
in the face (Oosterhof & Todorov, 2009; Stirrat & Perrett, 2010).
Some of the behavioral cues that underpin characterological judg-
ments of this kind are overt and highly salient, such as continuous
angry outbursts. However, other cues are subtle and require the
integration of information over time, such as reevaluating charac-
ter in the light of behavior that reveals deception or dishonesty. In
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many situations, such judgments are based upon little more than
impressions gained in fleeting encounters in noisy social environ-
ments. Therefore, an important objective for social psychologists
is to understand how people form impressions about others using
subtle cues that may be encoded nonconsciously.
When interacting with another person, one salient source of
information is the direction of his or her gaze. That is, there is an
automatic simulation of the gaze direction of social partners. For
example, if a person looks to the left, an observer’s attention
automatically follows toward the left (i.e., toward the gazed-at
location or object; Friesen & Kingtone, 1998; Frischen, Bayliss, &
Tipper, 2007). This state of shared, or joint, attention facilitates
processing of important objects in the environment; it is also fast
and automatic, being difficult to override (Driver et al., 1999). This
means that, as well as being an important source of information
used to predict the future actions of other people via their current
focus of attention, direction of gaze can be used to deceive (Emery,
2000). Illustrating the latter, directed gaze toward or away from
favored environmental locations has been shown to influence
competitive interactions between conspecifics searching for valu-
able food resources (Bugnyar & Heinrich, 2006; Bugnyar &
Kotrschal, 2004). More prosaically, directing gaze (in order to
deceive) can be observed in skillful basketball players or football
players—such as Ronaldhino—who quickly look toward one team-
mate but simultaneously passes the ball in the opposite direction (see
the video at http://www.youtube.com/watch?vRulvevIFIpk).
Here, we describe five experiments that adapted the standard
gaze-cuing procedure to investigate what is learned about social
partners when we follow their direction of gaze (Bayliss, Frischen,
Fenske, & Tipper, 2007; Bayliss & Tipper, 2006). Consider Figure
1A: Some individuals always look toward the location of objects
presented soon afterward (“valid” faces). Response times (RTs) for
categorizing targets presented in these locations are speeded, since
these individuals’ direction of gaze provides reliably helpful in-
formation about the spatial location of the to-be-presented targets.
By contrast, other individuals always “deceive” by looking away
from the future location of target objects (“invalid” faces), slowing
response times. Participants do not appear to be aware of these
consistent person identity-gaze contingencies, and the magnitudes
of these gaze-cuing effects are comparable to when individual
faces look equally often toward and away from targets (Bayliss,
Griffiths, & Tipper, 2009; Bayliss & Tipper, 2006).
There are three critical issues. First, does implicit acquisition of
such gaze-cuing contingencies influence subsequent exchanges
with people in economic games? Previous experiments indicate
that reliable gaze-cuing can enhance explicit judgments about
trustworthiness as measured by forced-choice procedures (Bayliss
et al., 2009; Bayliss & Tipper, 2006). However, it is unknown
whether reliable (or unreliable) gaze cues in other people can
influence actual behavior in subsequent economic exchanges.
Second, what are the mechanisms that mediate these effects?
One possibility is that reliable gaze cues enhance the probability
estimates that particular individuals will respond generously in
economic transactions (Behrens, Hunt, Woolrich, & Rushworth,
2008; R. M. Jones et al., 2011), raising the possibility that such
individuals can be exploited in social exchanges. On the other
hand, gaze contingencies might also evoke broader emotional
reactions that could underlie generous, or affiliative, responses
toward any individual whose gaze has been helpful or trustworthy
in the past (Bayliss & Tipper, 2006). Possibly, such positive
impulses generate obligations to behave fairly toward such social
partners. Third, is learning or acquisition of the relationship be-
tween person identity and gaze contingency influenced by percep-
tual noise? The standard procedure for investigating gaze-cuing
involves presenting a static head against uniform backgrounds and
then generating gaze-shifts by lateral movements of the pupils/
irises (e.g., Friesen & Kingstone, 1998). However, actual gaze
detection typically takes place in noisy perceptual environments in
which social partners are moving, sometimes unpredictably, and
making rapid gaze shifts. Can we detect the effects of gaze cues
upon economic exchanges between partners in such perceptually
noisy conditions?
In the first experiment, we sought to establish whether helpful
gaze cues enhance behavioral measures of trust in an adapted
investment game (Fehr & Camerer, 2007). Participants who had
previously completed the standard gaze-cuing task were asked to
pass an amount of money to valid and invalid faces acting as
trustees. The trustees invested the money, which was increased by
some “market” process, before deciding how much money to pass
back, as profit, to our participants. In this situation, assessments of
trustworthiness are critical. We hypothesized that individuals who
had previously looked toward targets (i.e., the valid faces) would
be trusted to return more of the invested money than individuals
who always looked away from targets (i.e., invalid faces), prompt-
ing higher value investments. That is, we sought to test whether
patterns of eye-gaze that are implicitly encoded can alter subse-
quent behavioral (investment) manifestations of trust.
Experiment 1: One-Shot Investment/Trust Games
Method
Twenty healthy adult volunteers completed a standard gaze-
cuing RT task (see below), followed by a series of amended
one-shot investment/trust games and then, finally, explicit ratings
of approachability and trustworthiness.
Participants. Ten males and 10 females participated. Their
demographic and psychometric characteristics are set out in Table
1. All participants scored less than 9 on the Beck Depression
Inventory (Beck, Ward, Medelson, Mock, & Erbaugh, 1961),
indicating an absence of recent depressive symptoms (Beck, Steer,
& Brown, 1996). Participants’ scores on the Autism Questionnaire
(AQ) were also comparable with those reported in both community
and student samples (Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Skinner, Martin,
& Clubley, 2001). Finally, participants’ verbal IQs, estimated
using the Mill Hill Vocabulary Scale (Raven, Court, & Raven,
1998), fell within the normal to superior range.
Standard gaze-cuing task.
Stimuli. All stimuli were comparable to those used previously
(Bayliss et al., 2009; Bayliss & Tipper, 2006). Sixteen faces
from the NimStim face database (http://www.macbrain.org/
resources.htm) were arranged in pairs matched for gender, ethnic-
ity and approximate age. The face stimuli comprised two pairs
each of Black males and Black females and three pairs each of
White males and White females. In each experiment, pairs of faces
were allocated to Face Group A or Face Group B. Previously, 12
independent raters ensured that all pairs of faces were rated for
equal attractiveness and trustworthiness; and that, as a whole, both
T
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sets of faces (A and B) were approximately equal in age, attrac-
tiveness and trustworthiness (Bayliss et al., 2009).
Three versions of each face were produced, one with a direction
of gaze straight ahead so that the face looked directly at partici-
pants when presented in the middle of the computer display, one
with the pupils averted leftward, and another with the pupils
averted rightward. The faces measured approximately 10.6 cm 
10.0 cm. Eye regions measured between 4.0 cm and 4.5 cm from
the left corner of the left eye and the right corner of the right eye.
The eyes measured approximately 0.5 cm  1.0 cm, with pupils/
irises of approximately 0.5 cm  0.5 cm. As previously (Bayliss,
Schuch, & Tipper, 2010), all faces held a moderate smiling ex-
Figure 1. A: Trial structure for the standard gaze-cuing task in which the eyes shifted toward the left or right
side of the displays (used in Experiments 1, 2, and 3). B: Trial structure for the amended gaze-cuing task in which
the head, shifted randomly toward the left or right side of the display (Experiments 4 and 5). Head translation
toward and away from the target location are shown for a single, “valid” face. Dashed line indicates midline for
illustration only and was not present on the screen. Head translation was approximately 0.8 cm and is not shown
here to scale. Valid faces were followed by objects presented on the same side as the gaze-shift; invalid faces
were followed by objects on the opposite side. The images were taken from the NimStim face database
(http://www.macbrain.org/resources.htm).
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pression and were initially presented looking straight ahead. Ma-
nipulations of the faces allowed the eyes to appear to look toward
the left or look toward the right.
The target stimuli comprised pictures of 36 household objects.
Eighteen objects were categorized as belonging in the kitchen, and
18 objects were categorized as belonging in the garage. The
objects appeared in red, blue, green, or yellow and in two orien-
tations (e.g., handles of objects on the left or right), yielding 288
stimuli. Targets varied between 1.5  3.0 cm and 5.0  8.0 cm
and were presented centered at 10.0 cm toward the left or toward
the right of the center of the screen (Bayliss, Paul, Cannon, &
Tipper, 2006).
Procedure. Participants were seated, centrally and at an ap-
propriate height, in front of a standard computer display. Task
stimuli were presented at a distance of approximately 60 cm. At
the start of each trial, participants fixated a central cross while
covering two response keys with the forefinger and thumb of their
dominant hand. Following a delay of 600 ms, the cross was
replaced by a face (see Figure 1A). After another 1,500 ms, the
eyes of the face looked toward the right or left. A household object
appeared 500 ms later on the left or right of the display. Partici-
pants were instructed to decide, as quickly and accurately as
possible, whether the object belonged (typically) in the garage (“h”
key) or kitchen (spacebar key). Auditory feedback followed:
bell  correct; buzzer  incorrect. If no response was made after
2,500 ms, the trial was coded as an error, and the next trial
presented. Finally, a blank screen was displayed for a 1,500-ms
intertrial interval (ITI).
Participants completed 192 trials (two blocks of 96 trials), with
eight “valid” (eyes moving toward the target objects) and eight
“invalid” (eyes moving away from the targets) faces appearing 12
times in a randomized order, paired with randomly selected tar-
gets. For half of the participant sample, the eight valid faces were
taken from Face Group A and the eight invalid faces were taken
from Face Group B; for the other half of sample, this assignment
was reversed. Participants completed 16 practice trials with a
single novel face.
Data analysis. Mean correct RTs and error proportions from
the gaze-cuing task were analyzed using repeated-measures
ANOVAs with the two between-subjects factors of participant-
gender and Face Group (A vs. B) and the single within-subject factor
of cue (valid vs. invalid faces). All trials with RTs longer than
1,500 ms were excluded from the data analyses. Error proportions
were arcsine-transformed, as is appropriate whenever the variance of
a measure is proportional to its mean (Howell, 1987). However, the
error rates are reported as untransformed percentages in the text.
One-shot investment/trust games. These games were
adapted from those used previously (King-Casas et al., 2005;
Kosfeld, Heinrichs, Zak, Fischbacher, & Fehr, 2005). Participants
were invited to make single investments of between £1 and £10
with each of the 16 faces seen in the earlier gaze-cuing task.
Participants were told that the individuals shown in the photo-
graphs had previously attended the laboratory for a different ex-
periment but had agreed to participate as trustees in the one-shot
investment/trust games of the current experiment. This involved
the experimenters contacting the trustee to indicate the profit
earned by the participant’s investment on one randomly chosen
game and then allowing the trustee to choose how much of the
profit to return to the participant as the investor.
In each game, a valid or invalid face, with gaze straight ahead,
was displayed in a central position above the caption “Here is
Trustee n,” where n equaled 1–16 faces. Two seconds later, par-
ticipants were prompted to press the spacebar to continue, ensuring
that they had attended to (and properly processed) the presented
face. The caption was then re-presented to read “You have £10.
How many pounds do you want to invest with this trustee?” (see
Figure S1 in the online supplemental materials). Participants en-
tered an amount between £1 and £10 (in whole £s only) using a
standard keyboard. Following this, the caption was re-presented as
“You have invested £a; You have kept £10–a” (where a refers to
the amount invested). In the full version of the investment/trust
game, the caption was re-presented again, 3 s later, to state
“Trustee n. This investment is now worth £b,” with b being a sum
incremented every 300 ms to eventually reach three times the
monetary value of the original investment. At this point, the final
caption was presented as “Trustee n; You have invested £a; This
trustee will repay £c; This trustee will keep £b–c,” where b-c was
shown an incrementing number to indicate a large (generous) or a
small (mean) return. This display remained for 3 s, after which
participants pressed the spacebar for a blank ITI of 3 s.
Participants played four practice games with novel faces using
the full version of the game. However, when making investments
with the eight valid and the eight invalid faces of the gaze-cuing
procedure, the final stage of the game in which the investments
increased before trustees provided returns to participants, was
Table 1
Demographic and Psychometric Characteristics of Participant Samples in Experiments 1–5
Experiment N Male:Female
Age (years)
Mill Hill
Vocabulary BDI
Autism Spectrum
Quotient
M SE M SE M SE M SE
1 20 10:10 29.30 2.45 40.75 1.46 3.40 0.68 15.65 1.59
2 20 10:10 22.15 0.82 32.00 2.09 4.90 0.63 16.50 1.26
3 20 10:10 21.60 0.66 32.20 1.87 5.55 1.61 18.45 1.48
4 26 13:13 22.62 0.92 33.00 1.68 5.35 0.81 15.15 0.83
5 26 13:13 23.38 0.66 36.62 1.74 5.65 1.13 15.85 1.26
Note. Mill Hill Vocabulary  Mill Hill Vocabulary Scale (Raven, Court, & Raven, 1998); BDI  Beck Depression Inventory (Beck, Ward, Medelson,
Mock, & Erbaugh, 1961); Autism Spectrum Quotient  score on the Autism Questionnaire (Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Skinner, Martin, & Clubley,
2001).
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omitted. This ensured that participants’ investments were not in-
fluenced by variability in different trustees’ payoffs.
Pilot testing had demonstrated that the range of investments
offered to participants when deciding how much to invest with
each face (i.e., between £1 and £10) elicited sufficiently variable
behavior to facilitate the detection of different patterns of invest-
ment to the valid and invalid faces. Participants were also informed
that, at the end of the experiment, one investment made with a
valid or an invalid faces would be chosen at random and paid out
for real; the return being added to participants’ attendance fees.
Data analysis. Previous evidence suggests gender-specific
differences while playing economic games (Eckel & Grossman,
1998). Therefore, mean investments in the one-shot investment/
trust games were tested by analysis of variance (ANOVA) with the
two between-subjects factors of participant-gender and Face
Group, and the single within-subject factor of cue (valid vs. invalid
faces). The proportion of participants making larger or smaller
investments with valid compared to invalid faces was assessed
with a standard binomial test. Associations between differences in
investments made to valid and invalid faces, on the one hand, and
gaze-cuing effects (expressed as mean RTs for object categoriza-
tions following invalid faces—mean RTs for categorizations fol-
lowing valid faces) and AQ scores, on the other hand, were tested
with Pearson’s coefficients.
Trustworthiness and approachability ratings. Finally, fol-
lowing completion of the gaze-cuing procedure and the one-shot
investment/trust games, participants were again shown the eight
valid and eight invalid faces presented in the gaze-cuing task, this
time with their gaze straight ahead. The caption “How much do
you trust this player? Please select a number on the keypad” was
displayed at the bottom of the display for 3,000 ms. Participants
provided ratings using a Likert-type scale of 1 to 7, using the
computer keyboard. Blank screens were presented for ITIs of 3 s.
Participants repeated this procedure with the same 16 faces, and
the caption of “How readily would you approach this player?
Please select a number on the keypad.”
Data analysis. Mean trustworthiness and approachability rat-
ings were analyzed using repeated-measures ANOVAs with the
between-subjects factors of participant-gender and face group, and
the single within-subject factor of cue (valid faces vs. invalid
faces).
Debriefing. All participants were questioned in order to iden-
tify and exclude participants who perceived correctly that partic-
ular (i.e., valid) faces in the gaze-cuing task shifted their gaze
consistently toward the same side of the display as the to-be-
categorized objects while other (i.e., invalid) faces shifted their
gaze to the opposite side of the display.
Results
Participants’ RTs while categorizing kitchen and garage objects
were significantly faster following presentation of the valid faces
compared to the invalid faces (see Figure 2), F(1, 18) 10.70, p
.004, partial 2  .37. There was no marked or significant change
in error rates following valid compared to invalid faces (2.65 
0.54% vs. 2.60  0.55%; F  1), partial 2  .01.
Figure 2. Mean correct reaction time (in milliseconds) for target categorizations (“kitchen” vs. “garage”
objects) presented following valid and invalid faces in the gaze-cuing paradigm in Experiments 1, 2, 3, 4, and
5. Error bars represent standard errors of the means calculated for within-subject designs (Loftus & Masson,
1994).
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Debriefing confirmed that none of the participants in Experi-
ment 1 were aware that some faces of the gaze-cuing task always
looked toward the subsequent targets whilst others always looked
away from the targets, suggesting that investments made with valid
and invalid faces reflected implicit processes. Participants invested
significantly more money with the valid compared to the invalid
faces (Figure 3, top row), F(1, 16)  8.13, p  .012, partial 2 
.34. Inspection of individual participants’ behavior showed that 15
out of 20 made larger investments to the former relative to latter
faces (Figure 3, bottom row; p  .041).
The enhanced investments made to valid compared to invalid
faces were not associated with gaze-cuing effects (r  –.01);
neither were they associated with participants’ AQ scores (r 
.10). Investments were not substantially influenced by gender (F
1),   .06, or by the specific set of faces assigned as valid or
invalid, F(1, 16)  1.21, partial 2  .07. Finally, comparison of
participants’ explicit ratings of the trustworthiness and approach-
ability of valid and invalid faces revealed no significant differ-
ences (Table 2; Fs  1), partial 2s  .05.
Discussion
Experiment 1 demonstrated, for the first time, that completion of
the standard gaze-cuing procedure (Bayliss et al., 2009; Bayliss &
Tipper, 2006) increased participants’ monetary investments in
single encounters with valid faces when compared with invalid
faces. This behavior reflected implicit processing since our partic-
ipants were not aware that some faces, but not others, provided
gaze cues that had previously helped cognitive performance; nei-
ther were they accompanied by changes in the explicit appraisal of
trustworthiness and approachability. Therefore, the results of Ex-
periment 1 indicate that the implicit detection of reliable gaze cues
in other individuals can enhance behavioral manifestations of trust
in subsequent economic transactions.
The next question is whether we can learn more about the
mechanisms that mediate these effects. On the one hand, the
one-shot investment/trust games of Experiment 1 involved a
situation in which participants’ behavior could reflect exclu-
sively instrumental reasoning about which individuals are, and
Figure 3. Top row: mean investments with valid and invalid faces in the one-shot investment/trust games of
Experiment 1, mean offers to the valid and invalid faces of the one-shot ultimatum games of Experiment 2, and
mean allocations to the valid and invalid faces of the one-shot dictator games of Experiment 3. Error bars
represent standard errors of the means calculated for within-subject designs (Loftus & Masson, 1994); horizontal
dashed lines represent equal offers to valid and invalid faces in one-shot ultimatum and dictator games of
Experiments 2 and 3. Bottom row: frequency of investment increases (and decreases) to valid compared to
invalid faces across participant sample in Experiment 1, frequency of offer increases (and decreases) across
participant sample of Experiment 2, and frequency of allocation increases (and decreases) across participant
sample of Experiment 3. Vertical dashed lines represent equal frequency of investment increases (or decreases)
to valid over invalid faces in participant sample of Experiment 1, equal frequency of offer increases (or
decreases) to valid over invalid faces in participant sample of Experiment 2, and equal frequency of allocation
increases (or decreases) to valid over invalid faces in participant sample of Experiment 3.  p  .05.
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are not, going to prove to be the most generous trustees in
returning investment profits. On the other hand, it is possible
that processing other people’s reliable gaze cues may generate
other social, or affective, appraisals about them as social part-
ners. In principal, these appraisals may be detectable in social
exchanges that involve judgments about what is fair and what is
unfair.
Experiment 2 tested this idea by examining how completion of
the gaze-cuing procedure influenced subsequent behavior in
adapted one-shot ultimatum games (UGs) with valid and invalid
faces (Güth, Schmittberger, & Schwarze, 1982). In one-shot UGs,
one individual (“the proposer”) is given £10 and asked to offer
some proportion of this money to another individual (“the re-
sponder”). If the responder agrees to accept this offer, the money
is paid out according to the proposer’s intentions; however, if the
responder rejects this offer, neither party receives anything. Non-
cooperative models of behavior in UGs indicate that proposers
should offer, and responders should accept, the minimal offer
possible, realizing a Nash equilibrium (Camerer, 2003a). How-
ever, substantial cross-cultural evidence indicates that responders
frequently reject, as unfair, any offers of less than 30%–40% of the
money available; while proposers tend to offer responders signif-
icantly more than the minimum allowed (Camerer, 2003a; Oost-
erbeek, Sloof, & Van De Kuilen, 2004). Proposers’ generosity can
reflect affective processes, motivations to fairness (Haselhuhn &
Mellers, 2005; van’t Wout, Chang, & Sanfey, 2010) and even,
perhaps, the simulation of respondents’ emotional reactions while
estimating what might be considered to be fair or unfair offers
made by the proposers (Frith & Frith, 2006).
In Experiment 2, participants completed the standard gaze-
cuing procedure as above and then made proposals to split £10
between themselves and each of the valid and invalid faces in
a series of single-shot UGs. If completing the gaze-cuing task
induces merely instrumental judgments about the likelihood of
good payoffs from individuals whose gaze has previously ben-
efited cognitive performance, we might expect to see partici-
pants seeking to exploit the valid faces by making minimal or
less generous offers compared to the offers made to the invalid
faces. On the other hand, if completing the gaze-cuing task
induces prosocial appraisals about what reliable or trustworthy
individuals actually deserve, we might see the more generous
offers to the valid faces.
Experiment 2: (Proposing in) Ultimatum Games (UGs)
Method
Twenty healthy adults (10 males; 10 females) completed the
same gaze-cuing task as used in Experiment 1, followed by a series
of one-shot ultimatum games (playing as proposers) and explicit
ratings of approachability and trustworthiness. Participants were
assessed and debriefed in the same way as Experiment 1 (Table 1).
One-shot ultimatum games (UGs). These games were
adapted from one used previously (Sanfey, Rilling, Aronson, Nys-
trom, & Cohen, 2003). Participants were invited to play one-shot
UGs with each of the 16 photographed faces used in the gaze-
cuing task, having been told that the individuals in the photographs
had attended the laboratory for a different experiment but agreed to
participate as respondents in the one-shot UGs. Participants were
told that the experimenters would subsequently contact the re-
sponder in one randomly chosen UG and ask him or her to decide
whether to accept or reject the participant’s offer.
In each UG, a valid or invalid face was presented in the center
of the display above the caption “Here is person n”, where n
equaled 1–16 faces. Two seconds later, participants pressed the
spacebar to continue, helping to ensure that participants had paid
attention to the presented face. Following this, participants re-
sponded to the question “You have £10. How much money would
you like to offer this person?” (see Figure S1). Participants entered
an amount between £1 and £10 (in whole £s only) using the
number keys of the computer keyboard. To facilitate comparisons
with the one-shot investment/trust games of Experiment 1, offers
of less than £1 were unavailable. Once participants entered their
offer, the caption underneath the valid or invalid face was re-
presented as “You have given £a, you have kept £10  a” where
a indicated the amount offered; 3 s later, a blank screen was
presented for an ITI of 3 s.
Participants were informed that, at the end of the experiment, a
single one-shot UGs (with a valid or invalid face) would be chosen
at random and paid out for real; the money participants elected to
keep (rather than offer) being added to their attendance fees if the
responders accepted their offer. Participants completed four prac-
tice games with faces not seen in the gaze-cuing task.
Data analysis. Mean offers in the one-shot UGs were tested
by repeated-measures ANOVA with the between-subjects factors
of participant-gender and Face Group, and the within-subject fac-
tor of cue (valid vs. invalid face). The numbers of participants
making mean offers to the valid faces that were larger, smaller or
equal to mean offers to the invalid faces (to two decimal places)
was assessed with a standard 2 test. Mean offers to the valid and
invalid faces were also tested against a baseline of £1 and an
even-split of £5 with one-sample tests. Associations between
changed offers to the valid compared to invalid faces, gaze-cuing
effects and AQ scores were tested with Pearson’s coefficients.
Results
As above, participants were significantly faster to categorize the
kitchen objects and garage objects following presentation of valid
faces compared to invalid faces (see Figure 2), F(1, 39)  6.51,
p  .020, partial 2  .29. There were no marked difference in
errors following valid compared to invalid faces (3.05  0.45%
and 2.85  0.39%; F  1; partial 2  .01).
Table 2
Explicit Ratings of Approachability and Trustworthiness of the
Valid Faces and Invalid Faces Presented in the Gaze-Cuing
Tasks of Experiments 1–5
Experiment
Approachability Trustworthiness
Valid faces Invalid faces Valid faces Invalid faces
1 5.10  0.20 5.03  0.19 4.36  0.20 4.51  0.16
2 4.45  0.22 4.58  0.23 4.46  0.20 4.39  0.21
3 4.72  0.23 4.56  0.27 4.05  0.25 3.77  0.25
4 4.72  0.19 4.63  0.24 4.17  0.24 4.38  0.43
5 4.47  0.26 4.50  0.23 4.14  0.21 4.10  0.19
Note. Participants provided ratings using a Likert-type scale of 0 to 7.
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Replicating Experiment 1, none of the participants were
aware that some faces, but not others, reliably cued the location of
the to-be-categorized targets. In the one-shot UGs, participants’
offers to both the valid faces and invalid faces were significantly
greater than the minimal offer of £1, t(19)  20.73, p  .0001 and
t(19)  18.83, p  .0001, respectively. However, participants’
offers to valid faces were still significantly more generous than
their offers to invalid faces (Figure 3, top row), F(1, 16)  10.71,
p  .005, partial 2  .40. Fourteen participants made larger
offers to the valid faces compared to the invalid faces; while only
two made smaller offers, and four made (overall) equal-sized
offers (Figure 3, bottom row), 2  12.40, p  .041. Offers to the
valid, but not invalid faces, were also significantly greater than the
even-split of £5, t(19)  2.60, p  .017 and t(19)  0.858.
As before, the increase in offers made to the valid compared to
the invalid faces were not significantly associated with the mag-
nitude of participants’ gaze-cuing effects (r  –.05), participants’
AQ scores (r  –.12), were not influenced by gender (F  1,
partial 2  .02), or by which particular faces were assigned as
valid or invalid (F  1, partial 2  .001). Finally, as in Exper-
iment 1, participants’ explicit ratings of the trustworthiness and
approachability of valid and invalid faces were not markedly
different (see Table 2; Fs  1, partial 2s  .04).
Discussion
Experiment 2 tested between two hypotheses about how com-
pletion of the gaze-cuing procedure would influence individuals’
offers in a series of one-shot UGs involving valid and invalid
faces. The results showed that participants did not seek to exploit
trusted individuals by making smaller offers to valid faces com-
pared to the invalid faces. Rather, we found that participants made
more generous offers to valid faces; offers that were reliably more
generous than 50:50 splits of the £10 available. As in Experiment
1, this behavior was not associated with explicit awareness that the
gaze of valid faces had facilitated performance in the categoriza-
tion task; neither was it accompanied by changes in the explicit (or
conscious) ratings of trustworthiness or approachability of valid
faces.
Other evidence indicates that offers made by proposers while
playing UGs can reflect emotional states (van’t Wout et al., 2010).
The generous offers observed in the one-shot UGs of Experiment
2 suggest that our participants were disposed, or felt obligated, to
make larger offers toward the valid faces than the invalid faces.
The additional observation that these offers were significantly
higher than an even split of £5 of the £10 suggests an affiliative
impulse toward the valid faces. However, offers in the one-shot
UGs could still reflect the self-interest associated with making
offers that are large enough to be accepted by the responders but
no larger than necessary (Camerer, 2003a). Therefore, in our third
experiment of the series, we tested whether completion of the
standard gaze-cuing procedure influenced monetary transactions in
which this constraint is removed, and the behavior of the proposer
is not dependent in any way upon the actions of the responders.
One such situation is the one-shot dictator game (DG; Bolton,
Katok, & Zwick, 1998). In these games, individuals are given an
endowment (e.g., £10) and simply invited to allocate some pro-
portion of this money to another person. The money is split as
proposed; the recipient has no ability whatsoever to influence the
outcomes. Allocations in DGs are increased, or made more prob-
able, in the presence of eye-like stimuli making eye “contact” with
participants (Haley & Fessler, 2005; Nettle et al., 2013). However,
it is unknown whether DG allocations are influenced by the
reliability of gaze cues themselves.
In Experiment 3, participants completed the gaze-cuing task and
then allocated £10 between themselves and the valid and invalid
faces in a series of amended single-shot DGs. Generosity in the
context of one-shot DGs is typically taken to indicate (painful)
altruism (Camerer, 2003a). If completing the gaze-cuing task
induces an obligation to altruism, even while there is no underlying
instrumental (monetary) motivation, we should see more generous
allocations to valid faces compared to invalid faces.
Experiment 3: (Proposing in) Dictator Games (DGs)
Method
Twenty healthy adults (10 males and 10 females) completed the
same gaze-cuing task as used in Experiments 1 and 2, followed by
a series of one-shot DGs and, finally, explicit ratings of approach-
ability and trustworthiness. Participants completed the same as-
sessments as in Experiments 1 and 2 (Table 1) and were debriefed
in the same way.
One-shot dictator games (DGs). This game was adapted
from previous experiments (Camerer, 2003a). Participants were
invited to play a series of one-shot DGs with each of the 16 faces
shown as part of the gaze-cuing task. Participants were told that the
experimenters would add the value of their allocation in one
randomly chosen DG to their own and the recipient’s attendance
fees.
In each game, a valid or invalid face was presented in the center
of the computer display above the caption “Here is person n,”
where n equaled 1 through 16 faces. Two seconds later, partici-
pants were prompted to press the spacebar to continue, ensuring
that participants attended toward (and processed) the presented
face. Following this, participants responded to the statement (Fig-
ure S1) “You have £10. How much money would you like to offer
this person?” Participants entered an amount between £1 and £10
(whole £s only) using the computer keyboard. Following this, the
caption was re-presented as “You have given £a, you have kept
£10  a,” where a indicated the amount of money allocated; 3 s
later, a blank screen was presented for an ITI of 3 s. Participants
completed four practice games with faces not seen in the gaze-
cuing task.
Data analysis. Allocations in the one-shot DGs were tested by
an ANOVA with the between-subjects factors of participant-
gender and face group, and the within-subject factor of cue (valid
vs. invalid). The numbers of participants making larger, smaller or
equal offers to valid faces relative to invalid faces was assessed
with a standard 2 test. Mean allocations were tested using one-
sample t tests against baseline of £1 and even-splits of £5. Asso-
ciations between changed allocations to valid compared to invalid
faces, gaze-cuing effects and AQ scores were tested using Pear-
son’s coefficients.
Results
Again, and as in Experiments 1 and 2, participants’ were sig-
nificantly quicker to categorize the kitchen and the garage objects
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following presentation of the valid faces compared to the invalid
faces (see Figure 2), F(1, 18)  7.97, p  .011, partial 2  .30.
Error rates were not substantively altered (4.40  0.66% vs.
4.40  0.95%; F  1, partial 2  .01).
None of the participants in Experiment 3 were aware that some
faces always looked in the direction of the targets, whilst others
always looked away from the targets. However, in the one-shot
DGs, participants made significantly more generous allocations to
the valid than invalid faces (Figure 3, top row), F(1, 16)  6.34,
p  .023, partial 2  .28. Twelve participants made larger offers
to the valid faces compared to invalid faces, four participants made
smaller offers, and four made (overall) equal-sized offers (Figure
3, bottom row; 2  12.40, p  .041). Participants’ allocations to
all faces tended to be less than £5 or 50% of the money available,
significantly so in the case of invalid faces, t(19)  2.56, p 
.019.
The increased allocations to valid over invalid faces were not
associated with participants’ gaze-cuing effects (r  –.21) or AQ
scores (r  .14). They were also not markedly different between
the genders (F 1, partial 2  .01) or the faces assigned as valid
or invalid (F  1,   .01). Finally, participants’ explicit ratings
of the approachability and trustworthiness of the valid and invalid
faces were not significantly different (Table 2), F 1 and F(1, 16)
1.13, partial 2s  .23.
Discussion
Experiment 3 demonstrated that completion of the gaze-cuing
procedure induced participants to make more generous allocations
to valid compared to invalid faces in a series of one-shot DGs. As
in Experiment 2, this behavior was apparent even though partici-
pants were unaware of the difference between the two sets of faces
(in terms of one set of faces reliably cuing the spatial locations of
subsequent to-be-categorized objects) and even though partici-
pants provided explicit judgments of the valid and invalid faces as
equally trustworthy and approachable. In other words, in line with
Experiments 1 and 2, the more generous allocations made to valid
faces reflected implicit social processes.
Consistent with previous results (Camerer, 2003a), participants’
offers in the one-shot DGs of Experiment 3 were, in general,
significantly larger than the minimal offer but markedly reduced
compared to participants’ offers in the one-shot UGs of Experi-
ment 2. In one-shot DGs, in contrast to ones-shot UGs, the allo-
cation of money is not dependent in anyway upon the behavior of
the recipients; the critical decisions are made by the participants
operating as “dictators.” This means that the “dictators” can keep
as much, or as little of, the money for themselves; their behavior
is not constrained by the requirement to make allocations that are
large enough to ensure that the respondents accept but not so large
that they disadvantage the dictators unnecessarily. For these rea-
sons, generous offers in DGs cannot reflect proximal monetary
self-interest but could reflect the subjective value associated with
altruism or the reputation for altruism (Zaki & Mitchell, 2011).
Experiment 3 demonstrated that healthy individuals make more
generous allocations to social partners who have previously shown
reliable gaze cues, reflecting heightened altruism toward individ-
uals who have been helpful previously or, at least, the need to
maintain reputations for altruism when encountering reliable or
previously helpful individuals.
Thus far, three separate experiments have confirmed that the
reliability of people‘s gaze cues influence behavior in subsequent
economic games. Clearly, during the standard gaze-cuing proce-
dure, participants learn the relationships between individual faces
and the way that they can prove to be helpful or unhelpful.
However, the generality of these findings is limited by the static
faces presented in the experiments so far. Social encounters typi-
cally occur in very dynamic environments, raising the possibility
that the effects of gaze-cuing upon behavior in economic games
might not replicate in perceptually noisy conditions. Furthermore,
we already know that the neural mechanisms that underlie face-
identity representation and gaze perception are dissociable (Hoff-
man & Haxby, 2000), with occipital and fusiform regions coding
identity and recognition (Andrews & Ewbank, 2004) but parietal
and superior temporal sulcal regions coding for gaze direction
(Calder et al., 2007). The gaze-cuing effects demonstrated so far
must involve linking face identities to the reinforcement value of
valid and invalid faces. These complex associative processes,
requiring as they do, the integration of information from two partly
separate systems, may be vulnerable to perceptual disruption.
Therefore, we sought to identify a potential important boundary
condition in the effects of gaze-cuing upon behavior in economic
games. In Experiment 4, we introduced a small translation of the
face stimulus toward the right or the left concurrently with the gaze
cue. That is, the eyes might have looked left, but the head could
have moved a small distance (i.e., a pupil’s width) to the left or to
the right, independent of the gaze shift. In the context of our
design, this meant that the eyes of the valid faces always looked
toward the location of the to-be-categorized object (as in Experi-
ments 1, 2, and 3), but the face itself may have moved slightly
toward or away from that location in a nonpredictive manner.
Similarly, while the eyes of an “invalid” face always looked away
from where the to-be-categorized object would appear, the face
itself was equally likely to have moved toward or away from that
location. Thus, each face simultaneously provided two cues: one
predictive and one nonpredictive. Previous work shows that these
uncorrelated translations of the face do not interfere with the
attentional effects of gaze-cuing (Bayliss, di Pellegrino & Tipper,
2005). Therefore, we predicted that the standard gaze-cuing effect
upon object categorization would again be observed under these
conditions. However, this form of perceptual noise may disrupt the
effects of predictive gaze-cuing upon behavior in economic games,
equalizing offers to valid and invalid faces in a subsequent series
of one-shot DGs.
We also strengthened Experiment 4 in two further ways. First,
standard implementations of one-shot DGs allow players to make
allocations of zero (out of their endowments) as an expression of
economically optimal behavior (Bolton et al., 1998; Camerer,
2003b). In order to facilitate comparisons with Experiments 1 and
2, the participants of Experiment 3 were obliged to allocate at least
£1 (of the £10 endowment) to the valid and invalid faces in the
earlier one-shot DGs. In Experiment 4, this restriction was dropped
so that our participants were entirely free (as the dictators in the
games) to give as much, or as little, as they wished to the valid
faces and to the invalid faces as a stronger test of the capacity of
gaze cues to influence altruistic behavior in economic transactions.
Second, Experiments 1, 2, and 3 demonstrated that participants
favored the valid faces over the invalid faces in three different
economic games even though they were unable to (self)-report any
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awareness of the underlying gaze-cue contingencies, suggesting
the operation of implicit social processes. Nonetheless, partici-
pants might have been able to make accurate predictions about
which faces reliably cued the location of to-be-categorized objects
and which faces cued the opposite location and that the greater
advantage of the valid over the invalid faces in the economic
games reflected this awareness. Therefore, in Experiment 4, we
also asked participants to complete an extra manipulation check
that the gaze-cuing task produced only implicit knowledge of the
gaze-cue contingencies (Bayliss et al., 2009). Following debrief-
ing, participants were shown pairs of faces, one valid and one
invalid, and asked to indicate those most likely to look toward the
location of to-be-categorized objects. Accuracy in this discrimina-
tion task might reveal accessible knowledge that the faces differed
in their gaze reliability.
Experiment 4: (True) Dictator Games With
Head Movements
Method
Twenty six healthy adults (13 males and 13 females) completed
an amended gaze-cuing task, followed by a series of (true) one-
shot dictator games; explicit approachability and trustworthiness
ratings; and, finally, a separate discrimination task involving the
valid faces and invalid faces as a manipulation check for implicit
gaze-cuing. Participants were assessed and debriefed in the same
way as Experiments 1, 2, and 3 (Table 1).
Amended gaze-cuing task with head-shifts.
Stimuli. The stimuli were the same as those used in the above
experiments; that it to say, photographs of faces approximately
10.6 cm  10.0 cm, with eyes spanning between 4.0 and 4.5 cm
from the left corner of the left eye to the right corner of the right
eye. The eyes measured approximately 0.5 cm  1.0 cm, with
pupils/irises of approximately 0.5 cm  0.5 cm. All faces showed
a moderate smile and were initially presented looking straight
ahead.
Procedure. As before, participants fixated a central cross
while covering two response keys with the forefinger and thumb of
their dominant hand. Following a pause of 600 ms, the cross was
replaced by a face. After another 1,500 ms, the eyes moved to the
left or right along with a concurrent translation of the face to the
left or right by 0.8 cm (see Figure 1B). Critically, while the gaze
direction was linked to whether the face was a “valid” or “invalid”
face, the head movement direction was randomly selected. As
before, following another 500 ms, a household object appeared on
the left or right of the display. Participants were asked to decide,
as quickly and accurately as possible, whether the object belonged
in the garage (“h” key) or kitchen (spacebar key). Auditory feed-
back followed: bell to indicate correct; buzzer to indicate incorrect.
If no response was made after 2,500 ms, the trial was coded as an
error. A blank screen was displayed for a 1,500-ms ITI.
As in Experiments 1, 2, and 3, participants completed 192 trials
(two blocks of 96 trials), with eight “valid” faces (with eye gaze
shifting toward the side of the to-be-categorized objects) and eight
“invalid” faces (with eye gaze shifting away from the side of the
to-be-categorized objects) appearing 12 times in a random order,
paired with randomly selected targets. For half of the participants,
the eight valid faces were taken from Face Group A and the eight
invalid faces from Face Group B; for the other half, this assign-
ment was reversed. Participants completed 16 practice trials with
a single novel face.
Data analysis. Mean correct RTs and error proportions from
the gaze-cuing task were analyzed using repeated-measures
ANOVAs with the between-subjects factors of participant-gender
and face group and the within-subject factor of cue (valid vs.
invalid faces). Trials with RTs  1,500 ms were excluded from
analysis. Error proportions were arcsine-transformed; however, the
reported values are untransformed percentages.
(True) one-shot dictator games (DG). The one-shot DGs
were adapted from the one used in Experiment 3 to capture the
essential characteristics of true dictator games (Camerer, 2003a).
Participants played a series of one-shot DGs with each of the 16
faces shown as part of the gaze-cuing task above. As before, a
valid or invalid face was presented in the center of the computer
display above the caption “Here is person n,” where n equaled
1–16 faces. Two seconds later, participants were prompted to press
the spacebar to continue. Following this, participants responded to
the question (see Figure S1) “You have £10. How much would you
like to give to this person (£0–£10)?” This time, participants were
free to allocate as much or as little out of £10 as they wished
(whole £s only), but including allocations of 0. Following this, the
caption at the bottom of the display was re-presented to state “You
have given £a, you have kept £10  a” where a indicated the
amount of money allocated. Three seconds later, a blank screen
was presented for an ITI of 3 s. Participants completed four
practice games with faces not seen in the gaze-cuing task.
Data analysis. Mean allocations in the one-shot DGs were
tested with the ANOVA with the between-subjects factor of
participant-gender and face group, and the within-subject factor of
cue (valid vs. invalid). The numbers of participants making offers
to valid faces that were larger, smaller or equal to offers to invalid
faces was assessed with a standard 2 test. Mean allocations were
tested using one-sample t tests against baseline and even-splits of
£5 out of £10. Associations between larger allocations to valid
compared to invalid faces, gaze-cuing effects and AQ scores were
tested with Pearson’s coefficients.
Trustworthiness and approachability ratings. Participants
were asked to rate the approachability and trustworthiness of the
16 faces presented in the gaze-cuing task in the same way as
Experiments 1, 2, and 3.
Manipulation check. Finally, participants completed the pre-
viously validated manipulation check (Bayliss et al., 2009) to
provide further evidence that they were unaware of which faces
reliably cued the locations of the to-be-categorized objects (“valid”
faces) and which cued the opposite locations (“invalid” faces).
Participants were shown eight pairs of faces, each consisting of
one valid and one invalid face, and asked to indicate, using the
keys “1” and “2” keys, which faces they thought were most likely
to have consistently looked toward the side of the display in which
object appeared in the gaze-cuing task.
Data analysis. Evidence of knowledge of which faces were
valid and invalid would be apparent in higher scores, approaching
a maximum score of 8. So, scores were transformed as proportions
and tested against chance (0.5) with a one-sample t test.
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Results
Using the amended gaze-cuing task in which the head (but not
the eyes) shifted once to the left or right, participants’ were
significantly faster to categorize objects following presentation of
valid compared to invalid faces (Figure 2), F(1, 22)  63.33, p 
.0001, partial 2  .75. Error rates were not much altered (3.65 
0.41% vs. 3.33  0.48%; F  1), partial 2  .03.
Debriefing indicated that none of the participants in Experiment
4 were aware that some faces always looked in the direction of the
to-be-categorized target objects, whilse other faces looked in the
opposite direction. In the one-shot DGs, participants’ allocations to
both the valid faces and the invalid faces were significantly larger
than zero, t(26)  9.64, p  .0001, and t(26)  9.15, p  .0001,
but significantly less than the even-split of £5, t(25)3.85, p
.001, and t(25)  3.75, p  .001. However, this time, partici-
pants did not make significantly more generous allocations to the
valid compared to invalid faces (see Figure 4, top row), F(1, 22)
1, partial 2  .00. Although nine participants made larger offers
to the valid faces compared to invalid faces, 12 participants made
smaller offers and five participants made (overall) equal-sized
offers (Figure 4, bottom row; 2  2.85, p  .24).
The differences in allocations in the true one-shot DGs to the
valid faces compared to the invalid faces were not significantly
associated with the size of participants gaze-cuing effects (r 
–.16), or their AQ scores (r  –.25). In addition, participants’
offers in the one-shot DGs were not markedly different for male
and females (F  1, partial 2  .00) or for the sets of faces
assigned as valid or invalid, F(1, 22)  1.45, partial 2  .01.
Participants’ explicit ratings of the approachability and trust-
worthiness of valid and invalid faces were not significantly differ-
ent (Table 2; Fs  1, partial 2s  .01). Finally, analysis of the
manipulation check indicated that participants failed to score sig-
nificantly above chance (0.51  0.04) when asked to discriminate
between valid and invalid faces as those most likely to look toward
the location of to-be-categorized objects, t(25)  0.24, p  .82.
Discussion
In Experiment 4, the amended gaze-cuing procedure, in which
predictive gaze-shifts were accompanied by small nonpredictive
head translations (Bayliss et al., 2005, 2009), produced surprising
results. Although this procedure generated robust gaze-cuing ef-
fects, the reliability of these gaze cues was not now related to the
amount of money allocated to valid faces compared to invalid
faces in a series of one-shot (true) DGs. Therefore, while this
simple change in the gaze-cuing procedure did not influence the
capacity of gaze cues to control spatial attention, it did block the
associative processes that link person-identity to gaze reliability.
Obviously, encoding person-identity in social encounters where
Figure 4. Top row: mean allocations to valid and invalid faces in the one-shot dictator games (DGs) of
Experiment 4 (with nonpredictive head translations) and Experiment 5 (with preexposure 	 nonpredictive head
translations). Error bars represent standard errors of the means calculated for within-subject designs (Loftus &
Masson, 1994); horizontal dashed lines represent equal offers to valid and invalid faces. Bottom row: frequency
of allocation increases (and decreases) to valid compared to invalid faces across the participant samples of
Experiments 4 and 5. Vertical dashed lines represent equal allocations to valid and invalid faces.  p  .05.
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we monitor people‘s gaze depends upon face recognition processes
(Johnston & Edmonds, 2009; Young, Newcombe, de Haan, Small,
& Hay, 1993). Thus, moving the head (just once) disrupts these
processes sufficiently to block learning about whose gaze is, or is,
not reliable, at least as manifested in true one-shot DGs.
To test our hypothesis that person identification is disrupted
enough to impair the acquisition of knowledge about whose gaze
cues are reliable and whose gaze cues are unreliable, we designed
our final experiment to facilitate face recognition processes with
the intention of restoring the advantage of the valid faces over the
invalid faces in subsequent economic games. Experiment 5 was the
broadly same as Experiment 4, except that participants were first
introduced to the faces that would be used in the gaze-cuing task
during a one-back working memory task, as a familiarization
procedure. We wished to test the hypothesis that learning associ-
ations between face/person-identity and gaze reliability is resistant
to perceptual noise (implemented here as head-shifts) where face/
person-identity has been preestablished. Thus, in Experiment 5, we
predicted restoration of generous allocations of money to valid
compared to invalid faces in a series of (true) one-shot DGs. We
also asked participants to complete the same valid/invalid face
discrimination task as a final manipulation check for implicit
gaze-cuing.
Experiment 5: (True) Dictator Games With Familiar
Faces (and Head Movements)
Method
Twenty six healthy adults (13 males and 13 females) completed
a 1-back working memory task with faces, followed by the
amended gaze-cuing task involving head translations as in Exper-
iment 4, a series of (true) one-shot DGs, explicit ratings of ap-
proachability and trustworthiness and, finally, the discrimination
task involving the valid and invalid faces as a manipulation check
for implicit gaze-cuing. Participants were assessed and debriefed,
as in Experiments 1, 2, 3, and 4 (see Table 1).
1-back working memory task with faces. Participants were
asked to monitor the same set of faces to be used in the gaze-cuing
task and one-shot DGs, presented with straight gaze in a sequence
in the center of the display; and to indicate, using a simple button
key-press response, whenever an individual face was presented
twice on immediately consecutive trials. The faces were presented
in the same dimensions as all of the previous experiments.
On each trial, participants were shown a fixation cross for
500 ms, followed by a face for 1,500 ms. Participants indicated
1-back repetitions using the spacebar. Errors (both false positives
and omissions) were indicated by three large red crosses presented
for 500 ms prior to the start of the next trial. Two faces were
repeated once in each block of 16 trials.
Participants completed eight blocks of trials, seeing each face
for a total of nine times (eight times as nonrepetitions and once as
a 1-back repeat). Participants were instructed not to monitor for
repetitions over the intervals between blocks. The task lasted 6
min. Within each block, faces appeared in a random order. How-
ever, two different faces were preselected as repetitions within
each block. Participants completed one of four task versions, each
defined by the particular faces selected as repetitions within the
eight blocks of trials.
Results
Participants did not record any false-positive errors in the
1-back working memory task. However, there were some failures
to recognize face repetitions (omissions; 2.88  0.70%). Then, as
in Experiment 4, participants’ were reliably faster to categorize
objects following presentation of valid compared to invalid faces
(Figure 2), F(1, 22)  19.64, p  .0001, partial 2  .47. Errors
were not changed (4.52  0.68% vs. 4.22  0.76%; F  1, partial
2  .02).
None of the participants in Experiment 5 were aware that some
faces looked in the direction of the to-be-categorized objects whilst
others looked in the opposite direction. However, in contrast to
Experiment 4, participants once again made significantly more
generous allocations to the valid faces compared to invalid faces
(Figure 4, top row), F(1, 22)  6.82, p  .05, partial 2  .24.
Sixteen participants out of 26 allocated more money to the valid
relative to invalid faces, while five participants each made smaller
or equal-sized offers (Figure 4, bottom row; 2  9.31, p  .01).
Allocations to valid and invalid faces were significantly larger than
zero, t(25)  7.21, p  .0001, and t(25)  6.54, p  .0001, but
less than £5 out of £10, t(25)  4.51, p  .0001, and t(25) 
–5.16, p  .0001.
Increased allocations, expressed as the difference between those
made to valid and invalid faces, were not notably associated with
the size of cuing effects (r  .01), or AQ scores (r  –.02).
Participants’ offers were not markedly different for male and
females (F  1,   .00) or for the different sets of faces assigned
as valid or invalid (F  1, partial 2  .04).
Participants’ explicit ratings of the approachability and trust-
worthiness of valid and invalid faces were not significantly differ-
ent (Table 2; Fs  1, s  .01). Finally, analysis of the manipu-
lation check indicated that participants failed to score significantly
above chance (0.49  0.04) when asked to discriminate between
valid and invalid faces as those most likely to look toward the
location of to-be-categorized objects, t(25)  0.40, p  .69.
Discussion
Experiment 4 demonstrated that the simple procedural change of
introducing nonpredictive head translations in our amended gaze-
cuing task abolished the advantage of the valid faces over invalid
faces in a series of (true) one-shot DGs. We hypothesized that
these head movements disrupted face recognition processes and
impaired the ability of participants to associate particular person/
face identities with the reliability of their gaze cues. Experiment 5
provides convincing evidence to support this hypothesis. Famil-
iarizing participants with the faces of the gaze-cuing procedure,
using a simple 1-back working memory task, restored their ability
to learn which faces reliably looked toward or away from to-be
categorized objects. Specifically, participants showed the usual
robust facilitation of categorization times following the presenta-
tion of already familiar valid faces compared to familiar invalid
faces, and then made significantly larger monetary allocations to
the valid faces (relative to the invalid faces) in the one-shot DGs.
As in all four other experiments, there were no significant
differences in the judged approachability or trustworthiness of the
valid faces compared to invalid faces, and participants were not
able to report how the valid and invalid faces differed in the
amended gaze-cuing task; neither were they able to pick out valid
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faces as more likely to look in the direction of to-be-categorized
objects. Thus, these data support our hypothesis that implicit
acquisition of knowledge about gaze reliability is resistant to
perceptual noise where person/face identity is preestablished.
General Discussion
Monitoring and following people’s gaze can be beneficial when
joint attention is established over important locations or objects in
the environment (Frischen et al., 2007). However, gaze cues can be
misleading when they are used, such as by conspecifics competing
for valuable resources (Bugnyar & Heinrich, 2006; Bugnyar &
Kotrschal, 2004), or by Ronaldhino to misdirect an opponent on
the soccer field—encouraging false predictions about future be-
havior. Here, in Experiments 1, 2, 3, and 5, we showed that
following the gaze of reliable social partners can enhance the
behavioral expressions of social obligations. Gaze-cuing enhances
individuals’ propensity to invest money with people whose gaze
has been helpful, indicating that gaze-cuing can increase behav-
ioral manifestations of trust. However, gaze-cuing also increases
offers to reliable individuals when acting as proposers in the
one-shot UGs, suggesting that gaze information heightens obliga-
tions to behave fairly even when social partners are encountered
just once and would be unlikely to be able to punish attempts to
exploit them. Further, gaze-cuing increases allocations of money
to individuals with reliable gaze-cue while acting as “dictators” in
one-shot DGs, indicating enhanced (painful) altruistic impulses.
Consistent with previous experiments (Bayliss et al., 2009;
Bayliss & Tipper, 2006), reliable gaze cues influenced behavior in
these economic games without any awareness, on the part of our
participants, that some faces reliably cued the spatial locations of
the to-be-categorized objects while other faces did not. While
completing our gaze-cuing procedure, participants fixated the cen-
ter of each presented (valid and invalid) face and were quite aware
the direction of gaze shifted away from the participants’ face
toward the left or the right side of the computer display. However,
since their primary task was to rapidly classify the peripheral
kitchen and garage objects, the faces were irrelevant and could be
ignored. Consistent with multiple experiments (Bayliss et al.,
2009, 2010; Bayliss & Tipper, 2006), the irrelevance of the faces
to participants’ behavioral goals meant that none of them explicitly
recognized the face/person identity-gaze contingencies. Experi-
ments 4 and 5 provided further evidence that our results reflect the
operation of implicit social processes: Following completion of the
gaze-cuing task and the one-shot DGs, participants were still unable to
identify the valid over the invalid faces as those most likely to look in
the direction of the to-be-categorized objects. Nonetheless, in Exper-
iment 5, the person-identity contingencies were detected and then
utilized by implicit systems to regulate monetary transfers to social
partners during the one-shot (true) DGs.
Trait-based models posit that opinions of other people center
round character dimensions: warmth/emotion and competence/
dominance (Todorov et al., 2008). Here, we found that participants
favored the valid faces over invalid faces while playing the eco-
nomic games of Experiments 1, 2, 3, and 5 even though their
explicit ratings of the approachability and trustworthiness of these
two sets of faces were not significantly altered. This suggests that
the consequences of completing the gaze-cuing procedure upon
behavior in economic exchanges are unaccompanied by skewed
conscious judgments involving the warmth/emotion character di-
mensions of the valid relative to the invalid faces encountered in
these experiments (Oosterhof & Todorov, 2009; Stirrat & Perrett,
2010).
Our experiments describe an evolving understanding of how
gaze-cuing influences implicit social cognitive–affective pro-
cesses. Previous investigations of gaze-cuing employed forced-
choice to demonstrate that valid faces were judged as more trust-
worthy than invalid faces (Bayliss et al., 2009; Bayliss & Tipper,
2006). Experiment 1 extended those findings by showing that the
standard gaze-cuing procedure induced participants to invest more
money with the valid faces compared to invalid faces in a series of
one-shot Investment/Trust games; indicating enhanced behavioral
manifestations of trust in persons who have shown reliable gaze
cues. However, the investment games of the kind used in Exper-
iment 1 also involve instrumental reasoning about which persons
are, or are not, going to be consistently generous trustees in
returning investment profits. This left open the possibility that
processing gaze information can generate other kinds of social or
emotional appraisals including, for example, obligations to be at
least fair to people whose patterns of gaze have been useful
previously. Accordingly, Experiment 2 used a series of one-shot
ultimatum games (Güth et al., 1982) to demonstrate that partici-
pants who have completed the gaze-cuing procedure subsequently
offered more money to the valid faces compared to the invalid
faces. This latter finding suggested that people can develop an
enhanced sense of (social) obligation to be fair to social partners
who have shown reliable gaze cues in economic transactions.
Taking this line of reasoning one stage further, we noted that
proposers in one-shot UGs also need to estimate how large offers
need to be in order to induce responders to accept, raising the
possibility that larger offers to valid faces over invalid faces in
Experiment 2 might still reflect a degree of self-interest. Alterna-
tively, making larger allocations in these games could also be
moderated by broader positive or altruistic impulses (van’t Wout et
al., 2010). Therefore, Experiment 3 (as well as Experiments 4 and
5) used one-shot DGs (Bolton et al., 1998) to test whether partic-
ipants would allocate more money to valid faces even when that
element of self-interest is removed. Experiments 3 and 5 (but not
Experiment 4; see below) provide data to confirm this hypothesis.
Game-theoretic models of economic transactions are effective
methods for demonstrating how individuals’ behavior can be non-
optimal in economic exchanges. However, we acknowledge that,
in themselves, they do not allow us to isolate specific cognitive
processes that would have been influenced selectively by comple-
tion of the gaze-cuing procedure. Of course, gaze-cuing probably
influences multiple cognitive and social processes operating in
each of, and across, the three economic games used here: for
example, predicting which faces/persons were more likely to re-
turn profits or accept an offer in the investment/trust games and
UGs of Experiments 1 and 2; impulses to behave fairly in the UGs
of Experiment 2 or make altruistic offers in the DGs of Experi-
ments 3 and 5. However, notwithstanding these possibilities, the
most parsimonious interpretation of our findings is that acquisition
of implicit knowledge of which individuals show reliable gaze
cues prompts the expression of approach-based behavior up to, and
including, painful altruism in one-shot DGs. Our data also com-
plement other findings that generous offers in ultimatum games
can be prompted by the trustworthiness of responders judged on
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the basis of facial characteristics and coded by anterior insula
cortical signals (Kim, Choi, & Jang, 2012).
Although the effects of gaze-cuing in economic games appear
robust, generalizing across different procedures in five experi-
ments, we have also identified an important boundary condition.
Specifically, when the faces provided both predictive cues (as
movements of the eyes to indicate gaze shifts) and nonpredictive
cues (as small translations of the head), typical cuing effects were
obtained but no learning of the relationship between person iden-
tity and gaze reliability was detected. Thus, subtle interference of
face identification processes produced by a small degree of per-
ceptual noise, such as a single head shift to the left or right, is quite
disruptive. Other evidence indicates that the link between face-
identity and gaze-cuing can be weak (Frischen & Tipper, 2004); in
some cases, gaze-cuing effects being only enhanced with famous
valid and famous invalid faces (Frischen & Tipper, 2006). Simi-
larly, the emotional expression of the faces moderates the acqui-
sition of implicit knowledge of reliable gaze cues so that happy but
not disgusted (Bayliss et al., 2007), angry, or neutral (Bayliss et al.,
2009) faces elicit this form of social learning.
The finding that gaze-cuing can be enhanced, or persist in
memory, with famous faces (Frischen & Tipper, 2006), suggested
that it might be possible to restore the prosocial effects of gaze-
cuing in economic games even in the presence of head-shifts by
preexposing the faces in a simple 1-back working memory task.
Experiment 5 decisively confirms this prediction. These data in-
dicate that the output of neural networks that encode (facial)
identity is made available to overlapping systems that control
gaze-evoked shifts of attention in order to integrate the reliability
of gaze shifts over multiple encounters. Our demonstration of this
associative interplay between identity, gaze-evoked shifts of atten-
tion and reliability is all the more remarkable given that both face
identity and gaze orientation were irrelevant to the kitchen/garage
object classification task. Participants were told to ignore the faces
and, as shown previously (Bayliss et al., 2009; Bayliss & Tipper,
2006), were consistently unaware of the identity-gaze reliability
connection. Thus, it is unsurprising that implicit associative pro-
cesses can be disrupted by perceptual noise, at least in some
situations.
Finally, we note two outstanding empirical issues. First, the
present data do not indicate whether gaze-cuing heightens altruis-
tic impulses toward individuals with reliable gaze cues—opera-
tionalized here as “valid” faces—or diminishes such impulses
toward individuals with unreliable or misleading gaze cues—
operationalized as the “invalid” faces. Future experiments could
explore these possibilities by comparing behavior in economic
games involving valid and invalid faces with behavior involving
“neutral” faces that are as likely to look toward the to-be-
categorized object as they are to look away from them.
Second, we do not yet know whether the effects of implicit
social processes upon economic games are specific to clearly
social cues such as eye gaze, or whether other cues—consistent
but devoid of overt social content—would generate similar effects.
For example, one manipulation might pair some faces and a hat
with a peak that consistently point toward or away from the
location of to-be–categorized objects. Possibly, as in the case of
symbolic cues such as arrows (Tipples, 2002), such cues would
facilitate the categorization of objects as we find with standard
gaze cuing. However, in other work, we have shown that, while
such cues can reorient viewers’ spatial attention, they do not
engage the same social cognitive processes as directed gaze (Bay-
liss et al., 2006). Moreover, gaze-cuing effects appear to be sen-
sitive to agency, suggesting a role for theory of mind processes in
gaze-cuing itself (Teufel, Alexis, Clayton, & Davis, 2010). Hence,
the extant evidence strongly suggests that nonsocial cues associ-
ated with individual persons or faces would not influence eco-
nomic exchanges in the way observed here with gaze cues.
In summary, our experiments investigated whether implicit learn-
ing about gaze influences behavior in economic games. The results
show that people will tend to make enhanced investments in a series
of one-shot investment/trust games with social partners’ whose gaze
cues have been reliable previously; they will also make enhanced
offers in one-shot UGs and more generous allocations in one-shot
DGs. These behaviors reveal altruistic impulses toward social partners
with helpful gaze cues. However, the tendency to favor partners with
reliable gaze cues over those with unreliable gaze cues can be abol-
ished by perceptual noise that disrupts person-recognition processes,
indicating the effects of gaze-cuing in economic exchanges depends
upon the interplay of systems that encode identity and control gaze-
evoked shifts of visual attention, integrating the value of gaze-shifts
over multiple encounters.
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